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Abstract  
Ideas enter our mind, a realization can dawn on us, and we should let bad news sink in. This 
article argues that experimental narrative can destabilize this widespread tendency to describe 
mental processes through spatial metaphors. My case studies are J. G. Ballard’s short story ‘The 
Terminal Beach’ (1964) and Dear Esther (2012), an arthouse video game developed by The 
Chinese Room. These narratives develop and literalize metaphors for mind by foregrounding 
the continuity between the physical space of the setting (an island) and the protagonists’ 
existential predicament. Going beyond a dualistic reading of the ‘mind as space’ metaphor, 
these texts construct spaces that are more than a symbol for the characters’ mental processes: 
narrative space is causally linked to mind in neurophysiological terms (in Ballard’s short story), 
or extends the protagonist’s emotional meaning-making (in Dear Esther). This set-up is 
unsettling, I contend, because it raises deep questions about the relationship between subjective 
experience and material realities. By exploring these narratives and their ramifications, the 
article seeks to open a conversation between the cognitive humanities and the ‘nonhuman turn’ 
in contemporary literary studies. 
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Introduction  
Mind scientists of the ‘embodied’ stripe have been making a powerful case for the cognitive 
centrality of organism-environment interactions. As researchers in the area of embodied 
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cognition argue, living organisms are coupled with the world through feedback loops of 
sensorimotor actions and responses that are constitutive of perception (Noë 2004) and basic 
experience (Hutto and Myin 2012). In cognitively complex organisms like human beings, these 
loops are not purely external, physical happenings, but they shape our conceptual structure 
through what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call ‘image schemata’—that is, Gestalt-like patterns 
derived from perceptual experience.  
As an example of image schema, consider the notion of obstruction or ‘blockage’ (Evans and 
Green 2006, 188), which reflects an embodied scenario in which something—an object, 
perhaps, or another person—blocks a movement by physically getting in the way. This schema, 
so often experienced in day-to-day interactions with the world, can become a vehicle for 
conceptual thought: in a news article we read, for instance, that ‘the path for Palestinian freedom 
and statehood has been obstructed by Israel’s continuing policy of occupying and colonizing 
Palestinian territory’ (Shaath 2010). This sentence applies the notion of ‘obstruction’ to a 
situation that involves not only physical events—Israel occupying Palestinian territory—but 
also, and more importantly, intangible concepts (freedom) and a relatively abstract outcome 
(Palestine’s statehood). The image schema of obstruction, which has its roots in an embodied 
pattern of interaction with the world, is thus metaphorically used to model a complex situation 
that includes abstract ideas as well as events and entities distant from the here and now.  
Note the important role that is assigned to analogy and metaphorical thinking in this conception 
of cognitive functioning: the move from perceptual patterns to conceptual structure is 
fundamentally analogical (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Turner 1996). Our embodied encounters 
with the world lay down pathways for conceptual thought, thus corroborating the hypothesis 
that mind and world are closely bound up. This much has been extensively, and persuasively, 
shown by philosophers and mind scientists affiliated with enactive, embodied, and extended 
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cognition: the mind, they contend, is not dualistically opposed to the world but ‘world-
involving’ at a very basic level. I am thinking in particular of the so-called ‘extended mind 
hypothesis’ advanced by Clark and Chalmers (2010) in an influential paper: their core claim is 
that the mind involves the external world, through material artefacts and tools (for instance, pen 
and paper or a smartphone) that can play a causal role in human cognition. As Clark and 
Chalmers put it, ‘the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right’ (2010, 29). 
This article argues that narrative can confront us with the world-involving nature of mind by 
challenging widely held presumptions about the dualistic separation between mind and world. 
I will be looking at two experimental narratives that place this challenge at their very focus. 
These narratives occur in different media but deal with a similar set of thematic concerns: they 
are a short story by J. G. Ballard, ‘The Terminal Beach’ (1964), and Dear Esther, an 
experimental video game developed by the British game development studio The Chinese 
Room and released in 2012. I will have more to say about these case studies in the next section.1 
For now, let me introduce the kind of world-mind entanglement that is, on my reading, at the 
root of both Ballard’s short story and the video game. 
Here is a curious fact: the language we use to talk about mental processes is highly 
metaphorical. Ideas enter our mind, a realization can dawn on us, and we should let bad news 
sink in. All these are relatively conventional metaphors for psychological events, and they 
converge on a single conceptual mapping—namely, between the mind and a physical space. 
The dawn metaphor, for instance, describes a specific way in which a thought can emerge, in a 
gradual process analogous to daybreak. The sinking-in metaphor, for its part, captures our 
becoming fully aware of the consequences of a piece of information—which is compared to an 
object being completely immersed in liquid. Psychologists have not failed to comment on these 
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metaphors for mental processes. John Barnden (1997), for example, has drawn up a 
comprehensive inventory of folk-psychological metaphors, including ‘mind as physical space’, 
‘ideas as physical objects’, and other common mappings. Even scientific psychology has never 
been able to avoid metaphorical language, as David Leary (1990) has shown in a review article: 
from Aristotle’s analogy between memory and a wax tablet (Draaisma 2000) to the computer-
inspired language of twentieth-century cognitive science, the history of scientific psychology 
is—essentially—a long series of shifting, and competing, metaphorical models. 
This article examines how a single metaphorical mapping—‘mind as physical space’—can 
underlie a plot and raise pointed questions about the nature of mind. The conception of the 
mental implied by spatial metaphors such as ‘the inner world’ has been critiqued by David 
Herman (2011) because of its inherent dualism. For Herman, spatial language goes hand in 
hand with a strict separation between mental and physical substance—with the former being 
incommensurable with the latter (hence, of course, the dualism). But the relationship between 
these metaphors and the question of dualism is far more ambivalent than Herman admits, as I 
will show in this article: when spatial metaphors are blown up and materialized in a narrative 
environment, as in my case studies, dualism may lose its grip; the direct connection between 
mind and the physical world comes into view.  
My argument attempts to bring together cognitive approaches to literature and recent 
discussions on the enmeshment of human and material realities in fields such as environmental 
philosophy and posthumanism.2 In one of the seminal studies in this area, Jane Bennett’s 
Vibrant Matter, we read: ‘In what follows the otherwise important topic of subjectivity . . . gets 
short shrift so that I may focus on the task of developing a vocabulary and syntax for, and thus 
a better discernment of, the active powers issuing from nonsubjects’ (2010, xi). My case studies 
help reduce the divide between (human) subjects and (material) nonsubjects without giving 
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short shrift to the former: these texts highlight how even subjectivity is based on physical 
processes; and they do so by turning the ‘mind as space’ metaphor into a material environment 
that readers and players can explore. These experimental narratives thus hold a mirror up to the 
imbrication of nonhuman realities and psychological phenomena—a point that I will develop 
in the conclusion. 
The Case Studies 
Given the theoretical agenda of this article, the inclusion of a short story by J. G. Ballard should 
come as no surprise. Influenced by Freud’s topological model of the psyche, the British writer 
embraced spatial metaphors for mental processes throughout his work: from the post-
apocalyptic landscapes of the early novels to the dystopian cityscapes of his later fiction, 
Ballard’s setting is always bound up with mind.3 In the short story ‘The Delta at Sunset’, a 
character puts this point as follows: ‘How else is nature meaningful, unless she illustrates some 
inner experience? The only real landscapes are the internal ones, or the external projections of 
them, such as this delta’ (Ballard 2009, 631). Ballard was not only a practitioner, but also a 
theorist of this spatial conception of mind: in a famous essay titled ‘Which Way to Inner Space?’ 
(1962), he critiqued the conventionality of science fiction and argued that the genre should turn 
to ‘inner space’—that is, the exploration of characters’ psychology in relation to what he called 
the ‘deep time’ (1996, 198) of the human species. Accordingly, biology should take precedence 
over the physical sciences in guiding the efforts of science fiction writers.  
My first case study, ‘The Terminal Beach’, demonstrates this interest in biology, and more 
specifically in human evolution: its protagonist, Traven, is an ex-military pilot stranded on 
Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific Ocean—the site of a number of US nuclear tests in the 1950s. 
Traven finds a research station on the atoll, coming ‘across a series of large charts of mutated 
chromosomes’ (2009, 596). In his half-delirious ramblings, he envisages the dawn of a 
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posthuman species, arising from the ashes of a nuclear catastrophe: he calls it ‘Homo 
hydrogenensis, Eniwetok Man’ (2009, 599). This species would go beyond the limitations and, 
in Traven’s term, the ‘cosmic guilt’ (2009, 599) of present-day human beings, with their heady 
mixture of fear for and attraction to nuclear weapons. The island and its concrete blocks thus 
serve as a monument—a ‘tomb of an unknown civilian’, as the text spells out (2009, 599)—
dedicated to the soon-to-be-extinct human species. Traven also experiences a more private kind 
of psychological trauma: we learn that his wife and son died in a car accident, and he claims to 
be looking for them among the island’s barren locations. The character thus fuses his private 
grief with concerns over the biological destiny of the human species—and we’ll see that the 
spatiality of the island plays a role in conveying this complex emotional state. 
Dear Esther is an independent video game developed by British studio The Chinese Room, as 
part of a research project on the artistic potential of the video game medium. The project—led 
by Dan Pinchbeck at the University of Portsmouth (see UoP News 2012)—was successful: 
when the game was released commercially in 2012, it drew considerable attention among critics 
and gamers alike. Dear Esther was praised for its vivid rendering of an island in the Hebrides 
archipelago and for the unusually emotional experience it offers through the monologue of the 
narrator and protagonist—who is, like Traven in ‘The Terminal Beach’—stranded on a remote 
island. (The similarities don’t end here, as we will see in a moment.) This unnamed narrator is 
the character we control in the game. Dear Esther belongs to the increasingly popular genre of 
exploration games, also known—slightly humorously—as ‘walking simulators’, where not 
much input is required from the player apart from steering the protagonist through a series of 
locations. There is little or no ludic challenge, and the emphasis is on what Henry Jenkins (2004) 
has called ‘environmental storytelling’—piecing together a narrative by uncovering clues 
scattered throughout the game world. In Dear Esther, most of the clues come from the narrator’s 
own voiceover monologue, which gradually reveals his past life and present circumstances—
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often by commenting obliquely or elusively on the places visited by the player. The monologue 
is partly randomized: after restarting the game, the player may hear a different snippet when 
visiting the same location—a device that encourages multiple playthroughs.  
The narrator’s musings are cast in epistolary form, as if they were letters addressed to Esther, 
his wife (hence the title). We find out that Esther died in a car accident in which he was also 
involved; there are indications that she was pregnant at the time of the accident. Just like Traven 
in ‘The Terminal Beach’, the narrator is overcome with grief, and we may ascribe the 
monologue’s occasional lapses and inconsistencies to the character’s mental imbalance. It is 
possible that the developers of Dear Esther even drew inspiration from Ballard’s short story; a 
passage would seem to corroborate this idea, referring to ‘the lost shores and terminal beaches 
of this nascent archipelago’ (‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 4, ‘The Beacon’). As remarked by 
game critic Thomas McMullan (2014), another important influence is William Burroughs’s 
‘cut-up’ technique—a further sign of experimental literature’s relevance for art games like Dear 
Esther. The snippet-like form in which the narrator’s monologue is delivered greatly contributes 
to the mystery surrounding his past and his relationship with the island, whetting players’ 
narrative interest and driving on their exploration of the game world. 
Indeed, both ‘The Terminal Beach’ and Dear Esther are examples of what Lars Bernaerts 
(2009) calls ‘narrative delirium’—namely, texts where the narrative progression, the plot, is 
fuelled by the protagonist’s incoherent or delirious perception of the fictional world. In the 
following analysis, I will tackle Ballard’s short story and Dear Esther—in this chronological 
order—in order to show how in both works the narrative delirium converges with the physical 
space of the setting. There is a long history of literary texts that use the motif of the island to 
stage and probe the separateness of human society from the nonhuman world: a particularly 
salient precedent is Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, along with rewritings such as, in the 20th 
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century, Michel Tournier’s Friday, or, The Other Island and J. M. Coetzee’s Foe. All these 
narratives foreground the coupling between the human mind and the physical world (for 
discussion in relation to Foe, see Caracciolo 2012). What is distinctive about Ballard’s short 
story and Dear Esther is that they radicalize the coupling into a complete breakdown of the 
subject vs. object binary: material space becomes integral part of the protagonists’ minds. 
Hence the counterintuitive force of these narratives, which performs an implicit critique of 
dualism: the characters’ deranged mind is not just extended into, but fundamentally blended 
with, the material world by turning spatial metaphors for psychological processes into literal, 
diegetic realities. In turn, this move signals how questions about the nature of subjective 
experience are intrinsically related to questions about the position of mind vis-à-vis nonhuman 
realities—thus bringing up the so-called ‘hard problem’ (Chalmers 1995) of how mind, and 
consciousness more specifically, can exist in a material world. 
‘The Terminal Beach’: Time, Space, and Nuclear Catastrophe 
Ballard’s text is subdivided, rather unusually for a short story, into 22 sections of unequal 
length, most of them titled after one of the island’s locations: throughout the text, Traven is 
seen roaming around the island and making a series of encounters—with the spectres of his 
wife and son, scientists involved in a research expedition, and finally the corpse of a Japanese 
soldier. What Ballard calls the ‘synthetic landscape’ of Eniwetok is described in minute detail, 
evoking a strong sense of place: for the willing reader, it is easy to project herself into the 
deserted and dust-strewn island, which is dominated by camera towers, concrete blocks, 
bunkers, and colourless beaches.4 The narrator explains that since ‘the moratorium on atomic 
tests, the island had been abandoned by the Atomic Energy Commission, and the wilderness of 
weapons aisles, towers and blockhouses ruled out any attempt to return it to its natural state’ 
(2009, 590). While the political and social implications of this human colonization of space are 
never completely out of the picture, Ballard chooses to focus on its psychological dimension. 
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Early on in the story we read: ‘This island is a state of mind’ (2009, 590). The protagonist 
himself reflects that ‘if primitive man felt the need to assimilate events in the external world to 
his own psyche, 20th century man had reversed this process; by this Cartesian yardstick, the 
island at least existed, in a sense true of few other places’ (2009, 590). With its abandoned ruins, 
the island’s landscape has thus become an externalization of deep-seated fears of nuclear 
disaster and annihilation. As a quotation from psychoanalyst Edward Glover’s book War, 
Sadism and Pacifism makes clear, these fantasies of extinction are not a twentieth-century 
invention but have their roots in the unconscious mind: ‘The actual and potential 
destructiveness of the atomic bomb plays straight into the hands of the Unconscious’ (2009, 
590), writes Glover. Ballard’s own take on the unconscious is unmistakably Jungian insofar as 
he posits species-wide psychological propensities—archetypes—connecting us with our remote 
ancestors. At stake here is a collective unconscious grounded in ancient myth and fears shared 
across the ages: ‘In some way its landscape [i.e., of the island] seems to be involved with certain 
unconscious notions of time, and in particular with those that may be a repressed premonition 
of our own deaths’ (2009, 597). 
This framework has important consequences for the temporality of the island—and for Traven’s 
(and therefore the reader’s) experience of it. We are told that the island’s ‘functional, megalithic 
architecture [is] as grey and minatory . . . as any of Assyria and Babylon’ (2009, 591)—a 
passage in which the reference to ancient civilizations reinforces the sense that the island is in 
touch with the ‘deep’ time of the human species.5 Yet the paradox is that, by prefiguring a 
nuclear apocalypse, the island appears to point to the future as much as to a distant past. The 
narrator observes: ‘The series of weapons tests had fused the sand in layers, and the pseudo-
geological strata condensed the brief epochs, microseconds in duration, of thermonuclear time. 
Typically the island inverted the geologist’s maxim, “The key to the past lies in the present”. 
Here, the key to the present lay in the future. This island was a fossil of time future’ (2009, 
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591). The oxymoron of the ‘fossil of time future’ conveys the difficulty of grasping the nature 
of this place, whose temporality is schizophrenically divided between distant past and 
postapocalyptic future. Predictably, this situation is not without consequences for Traven’s 
psyche: the whole story can be read as a thought experiment documenting the mental decline 
of a character exposed to an impossible environment. 
It is here that the space of the island begins taking on a more personal dimension: after the 
narrator’s initial stage-setting descriptions, the text shifts to an internally focalized account of 
the island’s impact on Traven. First, his sense of time collapses: ‘life became completely 
existential, an absolute break separating one moment from the next like two quantal events’ 
(2009, 593). Traven’s exposure to deep time causes a breakdown in his time consciousness: 
unable to link together the events he experiences, he is left with a series of ‘quantal’ (that is, 
discrete and microscopic) units. Space itself seems to be organized in a similar way; the island’s 
identical blockhouses are painstakingly described by the narrator as follows (note the explicit 
instruction to visualize, which may increase readers’ sense of imaginative closeness to the 
character): 
To grasp something of the vast number and oppressive size of the blocks, and 
their impact upon Traven, one must try to visualize sitting in the shade of one 
of these concrete monsters, or walking about in the centre of this enormous 
labyrinth that extended across the central table of the island. There were two 
thousand [sic] of them, each a perfect cube 15 feet in height, regularly spaced 
at ten-yard intervals. They were arranged in a series of tracts, each composed 
of two hundred blocks, inclined to one another and to the direction of the 
blast. (2009, 595) 
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These cubes are ‘quantal’ in the same way as Traven’s experience of time, and the narrator is 
quick to catch on the psychological effects of this spatial arrangement: ‘With their geometric 
regularity and finish, the blocks [imposed] on him a mood of absolute calm and order’ (2009, 
595). The narrator even ventures a neurophysiological explanation of the changes in the 
character’s psyche: ‘Since the discovery of the blocks he had become a creature of reflexes, 
kindled from levels above those of his existing nervous system (if the autonomic system was 
dominated by the past, Traven sensed, the cerebro-spinal reached towards the future)’ (2009, 
596). By directly acting on Traven’s ‘cerebro-spinal’ system, the island dulls his grief, making 
him temporarily forget his quest for his wife and son. This response is compared to a ‘reflex’—
a low-level reaction hardwired into Traven’s unconscious, which the island seems uniquely able 
to trigger. Not just the character’s sense of time but also his mood and existential feelings are 
altered by this place. Throughout the short story, this emphasis on the island’s psychological 
impact is bound up with the motif of the landscape as ‘code’ or ‘cipher’, a hidden message that 
the character’s unconscious mind can receive and react to, while his more conscious, rational 
self remains in the dark. In a short section paratextually marked as a ‘parenthesis’ in Traven’s 
narrative, the text reiterates the association between the island and the ‘spinal’ system, with its 
temporal orientation towards the future, but also adds the idea of ‘code’ as key to understanding 
Traven’s response to this place: 
Elements in a quantal world:  
The terminal beach.  
The terminal bunker.  
The blocks.  
The landscape is coded.  
Entry points into the future = Levels in a spinal landscape = zones of 
significant time. (2009, 596–97) 
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From this temporal and emotional viewpoint, Traven can envisage a posthuman being—‘Homo 
hydrogenensis’—a creature or perhaps even species shaped by nuclear disaster. Shortly after 
this realization Traven has a final hallucinatory vision of the island:  
Around him the lines of cubes formed the horizon of his world. At times they 
would appear to advance towards him, looming over him like cliffs, the 
intervals between them narrowing so that they were little more than an arm’s 
length apart, a labyrinth of corridors running between them. They then would 
recede from him, separating from each other like points in an expanding 
universe, until the nearest line formed an intermittent palisade along the 
horizon. (2009, 600–601) 
Mirroring the fluctuations in Traven’s perception, this description works towards connecting 
the landscape of the island with a larger spatial scale, signalled here by the double reference to 
the ‘horizon’ and by the simile comparing the corridors to ‘points in an expanding universe’. 
The text so far has highlighted the temporal relationship between the island and the distant past 
or postapocalyptic future, but it becomes clear that this interconnectedness is spatial and 
ontological as well: after this description, Traven attempts to take leave of the island, in a 
crescendo that goes from ‘Goodbye, Eniwetok’ to a final ‘Goodbye, Moscow, London, Paris, 
New York’. He stops only when he realizes ‘the futility of this megathlon farewell. Such a 
leave-taking required him to fix his signature upon every one of the particles in the universe’ 
(2009, 601). The island thus becomes a window onto cosmic realities, which Traven manages 
to sense without—however—fully embracing them. 
Ultimately, Traven does not and cannot turn into the posthuman creature whose rise he has 
foreseen. In a hallucinatory dialogue with the corpse of a Japanese pilot, Traven is told that the 
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dead, like his son and wife, ‘are fixed in our minds forever, their identities as certain as the 
stars’ (2009, 603). But Traven isn’t convinced of this alleged cosmic truth. In the story’s last 
section, he has a vision of ‘his wife and son watching him from the dunes’ (2009, 604) and 
waits for them to speak, as if he couldn’t dismiss their memory—and the sense of their, and his 
own, mortality. Traven thus comes across as a hybrid creature: he is able to experience the 
‘quantal’ temporality of a postapocalyptic future but remains painfully attached to his personal 
past. 
If the short story succeeds in grafting Cold-War-era anxieties onto the texture of Traven’s 
experiences, it is only through the unsettling spatiality of the island. Ballard attributes 
psychological significance to the story’s setting, but this move is more radical than the simple 
thematization of space: the island does not symbolically mirror Traven’s psyche. Rather, the 
barren landscape of Eniwetok effectively reshuffles Traven’s personality by tapping into his 
hardwired receptivity to calamity and extinction. It is hardly a coincidence that throughout the 
story the figurative language for Traven’s psychology is quite anaemic: at one point the image 
of Traven’s wife and son is said to be floating ‘on the river of his memory’ (2009, 594); a doctor 
claims that ‘there are rarer fish swimming in [Traven’s] head than in any submarine pen’ (2009, 
599); finally, towards the end of the story we read that ‘somewhere in his mind had appeared a 
small interval of neutral space’ (2009, 601). These metaphors are, of course, unobtrusive 
compared to Ballard’s descriptions of the island, which are highly consistent and likely to evoke 
a strong sense of physical presence.  
There is little room here for spatial metaphors because the figurative notion of an ‘inner space’ 
is elevated to a neurophysiological reality—the effect of the spatial features of the island on 
equally physical, material processes in Traven’s body: even his time perception is ‘quantal’—
that is, grounded in elusive but nevertheless physical particles. The island is no longer a mere 
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metaphorical ‘mirror’ of inner reality; it fuses with the character’s perception and becomes a 
material extension of his brain and body. Participating in Traven’s experiences as witnesses or, 
potentially, as empathetic proxies, readers are thus likely to realize that, in the language of Clark 
and Chalmers’s extended mind hypothesis, the character and the island are a quintessentially 
‘coupled system’ in which ‘external features [of the landscape, in this case] . . . are just as 
causally relevant as typical internal features of the brain’ (2010, 30). The short story, then, 
extends and literalizes the metaphors for the ‘inner’ that we normally use to discuss our own—
and other people’s—mental life. The overall effect is both memorable and disturbing because 
of how it challenges assumptions about the dualistic separation of mind and ‘external’ reality. 
In this way, ‘The Terminal Beach’ shows how human minds and the material world are joined 
in a psychophysical grip whose reach is not just personal and historical but fundamentally 
cosmic. 
Dear Esther: Material Anchors and Emotional Experience 
Dear Esther does not share the fascination with nuclear power of ‘The Terminal Beach’, but 
some of the concerns and anxieties it voices are comparable to Traven’s. However, the video 
game’s approach to this subject-matter is quite different from Ballard’s. This is no internally 
focalized text, but rather a first-person narrative based—as we’ve seen above—on snippets of 
monologue; the format is epistolary, and the narrator’s words are addressed to Esther (his dead 
wife). The interactivity of the game world is limited: we can explore as much as we like, but 
we cannot change the course of events; all we can do is trace a path—a relatively linear and 
pre-scripted one—through the island. The narrator’s monologues are triggered by specific 
locations or sights, often in carefully staged scenes. Yet very few plot details are spelled out in 
the game: the player is asked to perform considerable inferential work in order to connect the 
narrator’s often ambiguous and poetic lines to the physical objects found in the game world; 
arguably, this strategy, combined with the relative freedom of exploration that comes with the 
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game medium, contribute to drawing the player into the narrator’s emotional predicament. In 
literary games such as Dear Esther mind is evoked obliquely, but no less effectively, via 
feedback loops of player engagement with the represented environment and inferences based 
on the game’s overt language. 
Consider, for example, a sequence from the last part of the game.6 Walking along a cliff, we 
run into a candle-lit display of photographs showing a car crash—probably the crash in which 
Esther lost her life. This triggers a monologue, which at first seems to have little to do with the 
photographs or even with the avatar’s surroundings. Towards the end of this text, however, a 
few suggestive details emerge: the ‘ashes’ point to Esther’s death, while the ‘tarmac’, the 
‘Sanford junction’, and the ‘hard shoulder’ are clear references to the scene of the accident. A 
second candle-lit shrine displays a defibrillator and a small collection of surgical instruments—
all objects that serve as painful reminders of Esther’s death. These carefully staged encounters 
are meant to convey the narrator’s grief; interestingly, they seem to complement—rather than 
overlap with—the narrator’s monologue. On the one hand, the objects scattered throughout the 
game world make sense only because we infer a narrative from the narrator’s words. On the 
other hand, and this is the crucial aspect, the monologue—while poetic in tone—is largely 
devoid of direct expressions of the narrator’s emotions: his love for Esther remains unstated, 
and we find few (if any) attempts at capturing how the narrator actually feels. The metaphors 
and similes are directed not at emotional experience, but at the physical sensation of pain: ‘The 
infection in my leg is an oilrig that dredges black muck up from deep inside my bones. . . . The 
pain flows through me like an underground sea’ (‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 3, ‘The Caves’). 
Even when it comes to expressing his inner experience, the narrator resorts to imagery that is 
reminiscent of the maritime space of the island: the oilrig, but especially the ‘underground sea’ 
(which points to the underground water in the cave complex explored by the player in this part 
of the game).  
16 
 
Clearly, the narrator’s affectivity seems to be devolved to the island, in the form of the candle-
lit altars or other material stand-ins for his traumatic experience of loss. The protagonist’s grief 
is thus externalized onto the island as players are asked to connect the dots between the verbal 
narrative and the physical environment they explore. This is an extreme case of extended 
cognition, one in which experiences that are traditionally seen as inner and private are offloaded 
onto the world through what Edwin Hutchins (1995) would call ‘material anchors’—that is, 
physical objects standing in for relatively abstract meanings (in this case, the narrator’s 
emotions).  
Should we conclude that space in Dear Esther is purely symbolic—a projection of the 
protagonist’s state of mind? We’ve seen that this was not the case for Ballard’s island, because 
the narrator repeatedly emphasizes that this postapocalyptic space undermines Traven’s mental 
processes through real, neurophysiologically grounded effects. Something similar happens in 
Dear Esther, particularly because of the associations generated by the narrator’s monologue. 
We’ve seen that the script never lingers on the protagonist’s emotional experience. What the 
script does, however, is consistently map his body and bodily functions onto the space of the 
island, leading to a number of surprising—if slightly puzzling—metaphorical associations. This 
effect is visible already in the opening monologue: ‘Dear Esther. I sometimes feel as if I’ve 
given birth to this island. Somewhere, between the longitude and latitude a split opened up and 
it beached remotely here’ (‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 1, ‘The Lighthouse’). Note how the 
symbolic reading of the island is discouraged by the narrator’s claim to have ‘given birth’ to 
this place—a metaphor that puts his attitude towards the game world firmly in the realm of 
bodily, not mentalistic, experience. The following sentence could be taken to describe—again, 
metaphorically—a psychological ‘split’ (possibly between the time before and after Esther’s 
death), but the image of the split ‘beaching’ here quickly reabsorbs the mental into the physical.  
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Throughout the monologue, the island is not invested with psychological significance, but with 
bodily experience. The narrator constantly refers to the caves as the island’s ‘guts’, ‘belly’, and 
‘veins’. At times the focus shifts, and it is not the island to have ‘guts’, but the narrator to have 
his own guts in the caves: ‘If the caves are my guts, this must be the place where the stones are 
first formed. The bacteria phosphoresce and rise, singing, through the tunnels’ (‘Dear Esther 
Script’ 2014, pt. 3, ‘The Caves’). We infer that the narrator suffered from kidney stones, and 
the physical environment is often depicted as mysteriously resulting from these stones: ‘I had 
kidney stones, and you visited me in the hospital. After the operation, when I was still half 
submerged in anaesthetic, your outline and your speech both blurred. Now my stones have 
grown into an island and made their escape’ (‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 2, ‘The Buoy’). The 
story follows the narrator’s mental and physical decline, and at one point the chalk lines visible 
on the island’s cliffs are compared to the marks of an infection making its way through his 
body. In another monologue the body becomes a vehicle used to reach the island: ‘I’ve rowed 
to this island in a heart without a bottom; all the bacteria of my gut rising up to sing to me’ 
(‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 1, ‘The Lighthouse’). Finally, in the following passage it is 
Esther’s body, not the narrator’s, to become one with the space of the island: ‘You were all the 
world like a beach to me, laid out for investigation, your geography telling one story, but hinting 
at the geology hidden behind the cuts and bruises’ (‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 2, ‘The 
Buoy’). 
This allusion to ‘cuts and bruises’ is probably another echo of Esther’s death. We should keep 
in mind that, in Dear Esther, the narrator’s embodied attitude towards the island is always 
mediated by a keen awareness of the body’s mortality—his own and Esther’s. Thus, the 
metaphorical blend between the physical features of the environment and the human body is 
complicated by a third layer of associations—namely, between the island’s natural landscape 
and the human-made space of the highway where the car accident occurred. For example, the 
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narrator wonders: ‘Was this island formed during the moment of impact; when we were torn 
loose from our moorings and the seatbelts cut motorway lanes into our chests and shoulders, 
did it first break surface then?’ (‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 1, ‘The Lighthouse’). This 
passage brings to light the material creativity of space—how the island may have been created 
by the mechanics of a crash, in a strange loop that apparently cuts human beings out of any 
sense of goal-directed causality. (Once again, this is strongly reminiscent of Ballard’s fiction, 
and particularly of the urban dystopias of novels like Crash.)  
Ultimately, Dear Esther is marked by what Stacy Alaimo (2010) would call ‘transcorporeality’: 
a sense of fluid embodiment, where the boundaries between bodily feelings and world (and 
between human and nonhuman spaces) are constantly blurred and renegotiated. Readers’ 
familiarity with body parts and diseases is leveraged towards their understanding of the island’s 
physical environment—and, vice versa, the island’s geography serves to render the narrator’s 
bodily experience and objectify (through the affect-laden props) his grieving process. This 
continuous interchange between the physical, the bodily, and the emotional is demonstrated by 
the following passage: 
Dear Esther. I have found myself to be as featureless as this ocean, as shallow 
and unoccupied as this bay, a listless wreck without identification. My rocks 
are these bones and a careful fence to keep the precipice at bay. Shot through 
me caves, my forehead a mount, this aerial will transmit into me so. . . . I will 
carry a torch for you; I will leave it at the foot of my headstone. You will 
need it for the tunnels that carry me under. (‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 2, 
‘The Buoy’) 
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This passage works through a systematic inversion of spatial boundaries. We would expect a 
metaphor along the lines of ‘My bones are these rocks’, but the narrator states ‘My rocks are 
these bones’, as if the text were enunciated not from the familiar perspective of metaphorical 
identification with space, but from a more radical, posthuman viewpoint in which the narrator 
is the island. Likewise, the aerial will not transmit the narrator, but into the narrator; the caves 
are both ‘shot through’ the narrator and what ‘carry [him] under’. What emerges is a sense of 
embodied fluidity and productivity of space that does not depend on an external 
anthropomorphic projection: the human floats in and out of the island ‘without identification’, 
as the narrator explicitly states. This scenario is indeed shot through with affect—and more 
specifically with love for Esther and despair at her death—but these emotions arise from a sense 
of communion with the nonhuman world rather than from the narrator’s supposedly inner 
experience. 
The route to the mental taken by Dear Esther is more poetic and suggestive than Ballard’s 
approach in ‘The Terminal Beach’—a story, as we’ve seen, shaped by Cold-War-era anxieties 
and by an interest in the neurophysiology of humans’ interaction with space. But the two 
narratives have at least three key elements in common. First, they go against the grain of mind-
body dualism by highlighting the inextricability of human psychology and material processes: 
in Dear Esther, the narrator’s traumatic experience is conveyed by a rich network of physical 
objects and narrative cues. Second, both texts position the protagonists’ mental and physical 
struggles against a ‘cosmic’ background, as if exploring the mesh of human and nonhuman 
realities necessarily brought up questions about humankind’s position in the universe. In Dear 
Esther, for example, we read the following: ‘Where you saw galaxies, I only saw bruises, cut 
into the cliff by my lack of sobriety’ (‘Dear Esther Script’ 2014, pt. 2, ‘The Buoy’). Bodily 
injury—probably resulting from Esther’s car accident—is here compared to the island’s 
landscape (the cliffs), which is in turn mapped onto a vision of galaxies: only by embracing this 
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cosmic perspective is it possible to fully grasp the implications of Esther’s death, and perhaps 
take the edge off of the narrator’s grief. (This conclusion is clearly reminiscent of the Japanese 
pilot’s words in ‘The Terminal Beach’, with the cosmic statement that the dead are ‘as certain 
as the stars’; Ballard 2009, 603).  
The third element shared by Dear Esther and Ballard’s short story goes hand in hand with this 
cosmic emphasis; it has to do with the posthuman orientation of the narrative.7 This aspect is 
strongly hinted at by the video game’s final sequence.8 We see the protagonist climbing a radio 
tower and throwing himself into the void—in what is, apparently, a suicide attempt. However, 
one instant before the impact the protagonist turns into a bird, as indicated by the shadow 
projected onto the ground, and surprisingly flies away. This leads to a final tracking shot—a 
flyover of the island in which the avatar comes to rest over the sea, amid paper boats folded (so 
we are told in a previous passage) out of the letters he had sent Esther. While in ‘The Terminal 
Beach’ the posthuman consists in the evolution of the human species after a nuclear catastrophe, 
here it takes on a more intimate, almost metaphysical dimension: it is a shadowy hope of 
permanence after death—not in the sense of a dualistic survival of the soul, but in a final 
embrace with the nonhuman realities of the island, such as the gulls, the cliffs, and the sea. 
Conclusion 
My literary reading of Dear Esther ties in neatly with the focus of CounterText on literature’s 
continued presence in the contemporary cultural landscape: literariness emerges where one may 
not expect it, and the interactive, multimodal medium of the video game can resonate with the 
formal sophistication and thematic depth that we associate with a literary writer such as Ballard. 
Both ‘The Terminal Beach’ and Dear Esther take advantage of a setting with a long literary 
pedigree—the island—to probe their protagonists’ state of mind, thus revealing the imbrication 
of mind and world in our transactions with reality. The strategies they adopt to this end are 
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partly different: Ballard’s short story posits a background of unconscious neurophysiological 
mechanisms that determine the island’s impact on the protagonist’s psyche, connecting him 
with the deep time of human evolution—and projecting him into a posthuman future. Dear 
Esther, by contrast, documents the narrator’s grief process through a network of associations 
and resonances between the physical space explored by the player, with its mementos of the 
character’s past life, and the poetic monologue of the voiceover narrative. 
Both ‘The Terminal Beach’ and Dear Esther are, in an important sense, experimental, in that 
they overturn the widespread tendency to take spatial language for mental processes as a mere 
metaphor. In these works, by contrast, relatively conventional metaphors of mind are literalized 
into loops of mind-world interaction, where the world is key to understanding minds. Seen in 
this light, both narratives go against the grain of mind-body dualism—a position that is not just 
culturally dominant, but also to some extent cognitively hardwired (see Slingerland 2008, 394–
97). This explains the counterintuitive appeal of both stories. Metaphorical language for mental 
processes is, after all, susceptible to a dualistic reading: ‘mind as physical space’ is a metaphor 
insofar as—on a certain understanding of the comparison—the mind is not spatial at all, but 
exists on another, nonphysical plane. By focusing on the coupling of mind and the space of the 
island, and by suggesting—in different ways—that this space is real and not merely symbolic, 
‘The Terminal Beach’ and Dear Esther push back against dualism: they imply a form of 
psychophysical reductionism, a sense that the mind arises from patterns of bodily interaction 
with the material environment, without any dualistic residue. To restate this point another way, 
these narratives help us realize how any talk of the mind being ‘inside’ is fundamentally 
metaphorical: neither inside not outside, the mind is a process that involves subpersonal 
biochemical mechanisms and bodily schemata for engaging with an environment that is always 
already ‘us’, as Harold Fromm (2009, chap. 9) puts it. 
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These narratives also remind us that confronting the material basis of mind inevitably raises 
questions about the relationship between human subjectivity and nonhuman realities. How does 
mind emerge from ‘mere’ matter? How are we tied—invisibly yet powerfully—to nonhuman 
animals, human-scale objects, and even realities that escape our perceptual capacities by being 
too small or distant in space and time? As Thomas Nagel argues, ‘the mind-body problem is 
not just a local problem, having to do with the relation between mind, brain, and behavior in 
living animal organisms, but [one that] invades our understanding of the entire cosmos and its 
history’ (2012, 3). By itself, narrative cannot provide answers to these thorny problems, but it 
has the imaginative and emotional clout to show their relevance and, perhaps, their 
inescapability. Ecological philosophers such as Timothy Morton (2010), Jane Bennett (2010), 
and others have called attention to the entanglement of human life and nonhuman things, in an 
attempt to undermine a culturally entrenched, but deeply problematic, conception of the human 
as metaphysically sealed off from other kinds of realities. This article sought to demonstrate 
how the position of embodied cognitive science, and particularly its critique of mind-body 
dualism, converge with this philosophical program at a very fundamental level. It seems to me 
that this convergence opens up rich possibilities for cross-fertilization between cognitive 
approaches to narrative media and the ‘nonhuman turn’ (Grusin 2015) in fields such as 
ecocriticism and posthumanist thought. Metaphor should play a key role in this effort, for it is 
deeply ingrained both in our understanding of the mental and in our attitude towards nonhuman 
phenomena. At the same time, we should remain aware of the limitations inherent in any 
particular metaphor. My case studies highlight these limitations by elevating spatial metaphors 
for mental processes to a scenario of physical, embodied interaction with the affect-laden space 
of the island: by appealing to bodily experience and discarding a purely symbolic reading of 
space, narrative can thus challenge dualistic ways of thinking and put us in touch with realities 
beyond the human.  
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1 I view Dear Esther as an excellent example of a recent wave of ‘arthouse’ video games that 
engage with ethically relevant and emotionally resonant themes. This explains why I tend to 
focus on the script of Dear Esther and not on its gameplay: the game calls for a distinctively 
literary mode of engagement. I won’t be able to expand on this line of argument in this essay, 
but see at least Astrid Ensslin’s important monograph Literary Gaming (2014).  
2 For a representative sample of work in cognitive approaches to literature, see the collection 
edited by Bernaerts et al. (2013) and Lisa Zunshine’s Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Literary 
Studies (2015). 
3 I refer to Samuel Francis’s excellent The Psychological Fictions of J. G. Ballard (2011) for 
further discussion on Ballard’s sources and engagement with psychological themes. 
4 For more on sense of place and readers’ illusion of ‘presence’ in narrative spaces, see 
Caracciolo (2013). 
5 See Mark McGurl (2011) on literature’s engagement with the deep time of geological or 
evolutionary phenomena.  
6 A video recording of this sequence is available in the following YouTube video (starting 
roughly at 0:52:00): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEjvpHpVyiw.  
7 For further discussion of how narrative can embrace a posthuman perspective, see Caracciolo 
(2018). 
8 See, again, the YouTube video from 1:05:00. 
                                                 
